As a result of the increased popularity of group-oriented applications and protocols, group communication occurs in many di erent settings: from network multicasting to application layer tele-and video-conferencing. Regardless of the application environment, security services are necessary to provide communication privacy and integrity. This paper considers the problem of key agreement in dynamic peer groups. (Key agreement, especially in a group setting, is the steeping stone for all other security services.) Dynamic peer groups require not only initial key agreement (IKA) but also auxiliary key agreement (AKA) operations such as member addition, member deletion and group fusion. We discuss all group key agreement operations and present a concrete protocol suite, CLIQUES, which o ers complete key agreement services. CLIQUES is based on multi-party extensions of the well-known Di e-Hellman key exchange method. The protocols are e cient and provably secure against passive adversaries.
Introduction
As a result of the increased popularity of group-oriented applications and protocols, group communication occurs in many di erent settings: from network layer multicasting to application layer tele-and videoconferencing. Regardless of the underlying environment, security services are necessary to provide communication privacy and integrity. While peer-to-peer security is a mature and well-developed eld, secure group communication remains relatively unexplored. Contrary to a common initial impression, secure group communication is not a simple extension of secure two-party communication. There are two important di erences. Firstly, protocol efciency is of greater concern due to the number of participants and distances among them. The second di erence is due to group dynamics. Two-party communication can be viewed as a discrete phenomenon: it starts, lasts for a while and ends. Group communication is more complicated: it starts, the group mutates (members leave and join) and there might not be a well-de ned end. This complicates attendant security services among which key agreement is the most important. In this paper, we concentrate on secure and e cient group key agreement. We start by de ning a class of protocols that we call \natural" extensions of the 2-party Di e-Hellman key exchange and prove the security of all protocols in this class against passive adversaries, provided the 2-party Di e-Hellman decision problem is hard. This result allows us to craft a number of e cient protocols without having to be concerned about their individual security. In particular, we present two new protocols, each optimal with respect to certain aspects of protocol e ciency. Subsequently, we consider a number of di erent scenarios of group membership changes and introduce protocols which enable addition and exclusion of group members as well as refreshing of the keys. Altogether, the protocols described below form a complete key management suite suited speci cally for Dynamic Peer Groups (DPGs). However, it should be noted from the outset, that many other group security properties and services are not treated in this paper. These include: key authentication/integrity, entity authentication, key con rmation, group signatures and non-repudiation of group membership. Protocols and mechanisms in support of these are treated in another paper 1].
Dimensions of Key Agreement
All our protocols are based on contributory key agreement. This means that a group key K is generated as f(N 1 ; :::; N n ), where f() is some one-way function and N i is an input (or key share) hosen by the i-th party. The method of computing group keys must guarantee that: each party contributing one N i can calculate K; no information about K can be extracted from a protocol run; without knowledge of at least one of the N i all inputs N i are kept secret, i.e., if party i is honest then even a collusion of all other parties cannot extract any information about N i from their combined view of the protocol. The rst two requirements are obviously needed. The last property ensures that the inputs x i can be reused for subsequent key agreements. This is essential for DPGs, as will be seen below. Several contributory schemes key agreement have been proposed in the literature 8, 18, 4, 11, 20, 9] , however, none have been widely used. In practice, group key agreement is typically done in a centralized manner: one dedicated party (typically, a group leader) chooses the group key and distributes it to all group members. This actually translates into key transport, not key agreement. While the centralized approach works reasonably well for static groups or very large groups, it turns out that contributory key agreement is superior for DPGs, i.e, at (non-hierarchical) groups with dynamically changing membership. addition and deletion. The central security requirement on AKA is key independence, i.e., each AKA operation should result in a new group key that is independent of all previous keys. Ideally, the decision regarding who can add a new member, or delete on old one, should be taken according to local policy. There is no inherent reason to require the a single group leader to make these decisions. (One problem is with this setting is the exclusion of such a leader.) For instance, in some applications, each peer must be allowed to add new members and delete members that it previously added. This policy independence cannot be easily implemented in centralized schemes, while our schemes support it quite elegantly and e ciently. Another advantage of contributory schemes in general is that they automatically provide freshness of new keys: each party i can check whether x i was considered in K, hence, whether K is fresh. Furthermore, our protocols can be easily extended to authenticated group key agreement providing perfect forward secrecy (PFS) 15, 16, 12, 19] , as shown in 1]. This is necessary for robust protocols withstanding active attacks.
Initial Key Agreement (IKA)
IKA takes place at the time of group genesis. This is the time when protocol overhead should be minimized since key agreement is a pre-requisite for secure group communication. On the other hand, for highly dynamic groups, certain allowances can be made: for example, extra IKA overhead can be tolerated in exchange for lower AKA (subsequent key agreement operations) costs. Note that it is the security of the IKA, not its overhead costs, that is the overriding concern. In this context, security{as in the original 2-party Di e-Hellman key agreement{means resistance to passive attacks. Equivalently, this means the inability to recover the group key by mere eavesdropping. Naturally, IKA requires contacting every prospective group member. Contributory key agreement also calls for a key share to be obtained from each member. Hence, it may be possible to coincide (or interleave) with the IKA other security services such as authentication, access control and non-repudiation. This is something to keep in mind for the follow-on work. We also note that, in some environments, IKA alone is su cient. For example, if group membership is static or changes are very infrequent, AKA protocols may be unnecessary. The exception might be key refresh which can be mimicked (though expensively) with IKA.
Auxiliary Key Agreement Operations
As mentioned above, initial group key agreement is only a part, albeit a major one, of the protocol suite needed to support secure communication in dynamic groups. In this section we discuss other auxiliary group key operations and the attendant security issues. (See also Figure 1 .)
The security property crucial to all AKA operations is key independence. Informally, it encompasses the following two requirements:
Old, previously used group keys must not be discovered by new group member(s). In other words, a group member must not have knowledge of keys used before it joined the group. New keys must remain out of reach of former group members.
A related term found in the security literature is resistance to known key attacks (KKA) 15, 3] . A protocol is said to be KKA-resistant if knowledge of one or more past session (short-term) keys cannot be used to compute a current session key or a long-term secret. Generally, a known-key attack can be passive or active. The latter is addressed in detail by Burmester 3] . Since this paper (and our protocol model) is concerned with key agreement without any related services (e.g., implicit key authentication) we only consider passive known-key attacks on short-term session keys. Along the same lines, we are not considering PFS since no long-term keys are assumed in this context. adversary is assumed to be strictly passive, i.e., it may eavesdrop on arbitrary communication but may not, in any way, interfere with it. Furthermore, an adversary in the IKA/AKA protocols can be an outsider or a quasi-insider. An outsider is a passive adversary not participating in the protocols. A quasi-insider is a onetime group member who wants to (passively) discover group session keys used outside of its membership interval.
While the requirement for key independence is fairly intuitive, we need to keep in mind that, in practice, it may be undesirable under certain circumstances. For example, a group conference can commence despite one of the intended participants running late. Upon its arrival, it might be best not to change the current group key so as to allow the tardy participant to catch up. In any case, this decision should be determined by local policy.
Single Member Operations
The AKA operations involving single group members are member addition and member exclusion. The former is a seemingly simple procedure of admitting a new member to an existing group. We can assume that member addition is always multi-lateral or, at least, bilateral (i.e., it takes at least the group leader's and the new member's consent to take place.) Member exclusion is also relatively simple with the exception that it can be performed either unilaterally (by expulsion) or by mutual consent. In either case, the security implications of member exclusion are the same.
Subgroup Operations
Subgroup operations are group addition and group exclusion. Group addition, in turn, has two variants:
Mass join: the case of multiple new members who have to be brought into an existing group and, moreover, these new members do not already form a group of their own. Group fusion: the case of two groups merging to form a super-group; perhaps only temporarily.
Similarly, subgroup exclusion can also be thought of as having multiple avors:
Mass leave: multiple new members must be excluded at the same time. Group division: monolithic group needs to be broken up in smaller groups. Group ssion: previously merged group must be split apart. 1 Although the actual protocols for handling all subgroup operations may di er from those on single members, the salient security requirements (key independence) remain the same.
Group Key Refresh
For a variety of reasons it is often necessary to perform a routine key change operation. This may include, for example, local policy that restricts the usage of a single key by time or by the amount of data that this key is used to encrypt or sign. To distinguish it key updates precipated by membership changes, we will refer to this operation as key refresh.
Who controls a group?
All AKA operations will be started by a single party. It might be natural to assume that this party is a xed group controller, and this controller is the only one deciding to add or delete members. On the other hand, this is just one possible policy. Another reasonable policy would be to allow everybody to add new members, but only a dedicated controller to delete members. Alternatively, member deletion can be performed only by the party who orignally added them. In general, AKA protocols should be designed in a way that can support (ideally) all kinds of policies. The CLIQUES protocols actually allow any party to run any AKA protocol, thus, CLIQUES can serve as a basis for a wide range of policies.
Generic n-Party Di e-Hellman Key Agreement
The following notation is used throughout the remainder of this paper: n number of protocol participants (group members) i; j; h; p; d; c indices of group members M i i-th group member; i 2 1; n] G cyclic algebraic group q order of the algebraic group exponentiation base; generator in the algebraic group G delimited by q N i random (secret) exponent 2 Z Z q generated by M i S; T subsets of fN 1 ; . . .; N n g (S) product of all elements in set S K n group key shared among n members 3.1 Security proof outline All our key agreement protocols belong to a family of protocols that we refer to as \natural" extensions of the 2-party Di e-Hellman key exchange 5]: Like in the 2-party case, all participants M 1 ; . . .; M n agree a priori on a cyclic group, G. Let be a generator of G. For each key exchange, each member, M i , choses randomly a value N i 2 Z Z q . The group key will be K = N1 Nn .
In the 2-party case, K is computed by exchanging N1 and N2 , and computing K = ( N1 ) N2 = ( N2 ) N1 .
To solve the n-party case, a certain subset of f (S) j S fN 1 ; . . .; N n gg is exchanged between the players. This set includes all values N1 Ni?1Ni+1 Nn for all i. Obviously, if M i gets N1 Ni?1Ni+1 Nn it can easily compute K. The security of the 2-party case is directly based on the 2-party decision Di e-Hellman (DDH) problem: Given ( N1 ; N2 ; X ) decide whether X = N 1 N 2 (i.e., the secret key K) or some randomly chosen exponent.
This can be easily generalized to what we call the n-party DDH problem: Given f (S) j S fN 1 ; . . .; N n gg and X , decide whether X = (N 1 N n ) or some random value. In the following section we prove that if the 2-party DDH problem is hard, then the n-party DDH problem is hard as well. This proves the security of all natural Di e-Hellman extension at once.
Security of all natural extensions
Let k be a security parameter. All algorithms run in probabilistic polynimial time with k and n as inputs. For concreteness, we consider a speci c class of groups G for which it is commonly assumed that the 2-party Di e-Hellman decision problem is hard:
On input k, algorithm gen chooses at random a pair (q; ) where q is a k-bit value, q and q 0 = 2q + 1 are both prime, and is a generator of the unique subgroup G of Z Z q 0 of order q. Groups of this type are used, e.g., in Schnorr signatures 17] and DSS 6].
For (q; ) gen(k), n 2 N, and X = (N 1 ; . . .; N n ) for N i 2 Z Z q , let: view(q; ; n; X) := the ordered set of all Ni 1 Ni m for all proper subsets fi 1 ; . . .; i m g of f1; . . .; ng, K(q; ; n; X) := N1 Nn .
If (q; ) are obvious from the context, we omit them in view() and K(). Note that view(n; X) is exactly the view of an adversary in the generic n-party DH-protocol, where the nal secret key is K(n; X). Let the following two random variables be de ned by generating (q; ) gen(k) and choosing X randomly from (Z Z q ) n :
A n := (view(n; X); y), for a randomly chosen y 2 G, D n := (view(n; X); K(n; X)).
Let the operator " poly " denote polynomial indistinguishability.
Remark: Polynomial indistinguishability of the 2-party Di e-Helman key is considered, e.g., in 2]. The notion of polynomial indistinguishability is related to polynomial time statistical test as de ned in 22, 14] . In this context, it means that no polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish between a Di e-Hellman key and a random value with probability signi cantly greater that 1 2 . More speci cally, let K and R be l-bit strings such that R is random and K is a Di e-Hellman key. We say that K and R are polynomially indistinguishable if, for all polynomial time distinguishers, A, the probability of distinguishing K and R is smaller than ( 1 2 + 1 Q(l) ) for all polynomials Q(l). We do this by de ning random variables B n ; C n , and showing A n poly B n poly C n poly D n , which immediately yields: A n poly D n . We can rewrite view(n; (N 1 ; N 2 ; X)) with X = (N 3 ; . . .; N n ) as a permutation of:
( view(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 1 N 2 ; X)) ) and K(n; (N 1 ; N 2 ; X)) as K(n ? 1; (N 1 N 2 ; X)).
We use this to rede ne A n and D n . All in all, we consider the following four distributions. All of them are de ned by (q; ) gen(k), choosing c; N 1 ; N 2 2 Z Z q and X 2 (Z Z q ) n?2 and y 2 G randomly.
A n := (view(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X))); K(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 1 N 2 ; X)); y) B n := (view(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X))); K(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (c; X)); y) C n := (view(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X))); K(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (c; X)); K(n ? 1; (c; X))) D n := (view(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X))); K(n ? 1; (N 2 ; X)); view(n ? 1; (N 1 N 2 ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N 1 N 2 ; X))) Note that only the last two components vary.
A n poly B n follows from A 2 poly D 2 :
Assume that adv distinguishes A n and B n , and let (u; v; w) be an instance of A 2 poly D 2 . We produce an instance for adv by using u for N1 , v for N2 , and w for N1N2 (or c ), and choosing X and y randomly. If (u; v; w) belongs to A 2 (D 2 ), this new distribution belongs to B n (A n ).
B n poly C n follows from A n?1 poly D n?1 : Assume that adv distinguishes B n and C n , and (ignoring a necessary permutation in order) let: (view(n ? 1; (c; X)); y) be an instance for A n?1 poly D n?1 (i.e., the problem is to decide whether y = K(n ? 1; (c; X)).) We produce an instance for adv by choosing N 1 ; N 2 randomly, and computing (view(n ? 1; (N i ; X)); K(n ? 1; (N i ; X))) based on those values in view(n ? 1; (c; X)) that do not contain c as an exponent. The rest follows as in the last case. C n poly D n follows from A 2 poly D 2 , almost exactly like the rst statement. The only di erence is that we do not choose y randomly, but as K(n ? 1; (w; X)). In certain environments, it is desirable to minimize the amount of computation performed by each group member. This is particularly the case in large groups or groups involving low-power entities such as smartcards or PDAs. Since IKA.1 requires a total of (i+1) exponentiations of every M i , the computational burden increases as the group size grows. The same is true for message sizes. In order to address these concerns we construct a very di erent protocol, IKA.2 (see Figure 3 ). IKA.2 consists of four stages. In the rst stage we collect contributions from all group members similar to the up ow stage in IKA.1. After processing the up ow message M n?1 obtains fNpjp2 1;n?1]g and broadcasts this value in the second stage to all other participants. At this time, every M i (i 6 = n) factors out (divides by) its own exponent and forwards the result to M n . (Note that factoring out N i requires computing its inverse { N ?1 i . This is always possible if we choose the group q as a group of prime order). In the nal stage, M n collects all inputs from the previous stage, raises every one of them to the power of N n and broadcasts the resulting n ? 1 values to the rest of the group. Every M i now has a value of the form fNpjp2 1;n]^p6 =ig and can easily generate the intended group key K n .
IKA.2 has two appealing features:
Constant message sizes Constant (and small) number of exponentiations for each M i (except for M n with n exponentiations required) Its properties are summarized in the following and a nal broadcast phase. Our AKA operations take advantage of the keying information (i.e., partial keys) collected in the gathering phase of the most recent IKA protocol run. This information is incrementally updated and re-distributed to the new incarnation of the group. Since the nal broadcast phase is exactly the same for both IKA.1 and IKA.2 we also note that the AKA operations described below work with both IKA protocols. This results in exibility to choose an IKA protocol that suits a particular DPG setting.
Member Addition
The member addition protocol is shown in Figure 4 . The protocol's main premise is that the new member M n+1 becomes the new group controller. It is assumed that the \old" controller M n saves the contents of the last Broadcast message that was sent in the last round in the IKA protocol of Figure 2 N n N n is used in place of N n .) It might seem more natural to replace N n by c N n instead of combining the two. However, this way not just the group controller but any member who stores the latest broadcast message can initiate member addition. This feature may prove useful in some environments. Unfortunately, this potential bene t becomes a drawback in the context of member exclusion. (If any member can exclude any other member, anarchy will reign!) The role of the group controller is thus passed on to the newest group member. Although this protocol ts in nicely with the IKA, its basic assumption of a oating group controller might be unrealistic in some environments. For example, the new member may, in fact, be the one least trusted by the rest of the group. 4 In order to address this concern, we modify the present protocol to support a xed group controller. For the sake of clarity, we assume that, while the controller stays xed, its index keeps growing. In other words, the new member becomes M n and the group controller assumes the index n + 1. The resultant protocol is shown in gure 5. The rst message is a duplicate of either:
Up ow message in round (n ? 1) of the original IKA protocol (only if this is the rst member addition) OR Up ow message in round 2 of the last member addition protocol One interesting and useful feature of the two member addition protocols is their ability to co-exist within a group. Consequently, a group may start out with a xed group controller and, later, switch over to the oating controller mode or viceversa.
Mass Join
Distinct from both member and group addition is the issue of mass join. When is mass join necessary? In cases when multiple new members need to be brought into an existing group. In most cases, the new members are disparate (i.e., have no prior common association) and need to be added in a hurry. Alternatively, the new members may already form a subgroup but policy might dictate that they should be admitted individually. It is, of course, always possible to add multiple members by consecutive runs of a single-member addition protocol. However, this would be ine cient since, for each new member, every existing member would have to compute a new group key only to throw it away thereafter. To be more speci c, if m new members were to be added in this fashion, the cost would be: 3m rounds with xed group controller and 2m { with oating. Included in the above are m rounds of broadcast m exponentiations by every \old" group member The overhead is clearly very high. A better approach is to chain the member addition protocol as shown in Figure 6 . The idea is to capitalize on the fact that multiple, but disparate, new members need to join the group and chain a sequence of Up ow messages to traverse all new members in a certain order. This allows us to incur only one broadcast round and postpone it until the very last step, i.e., the last new member being mass-joined performs the broadcast.
The savings, compared with the naive approach, amount to m ? 1 broadcast rounds.
For brevity's sake Figure 6 shows only the oating controller model. A chained xed controller model can be trivially and similarly constructed from the protocol in Figure 5 .
Group Fusion
Group fusion, as de ned above, occurs whenever two groups merge to form a super-group. The only real di erence with respect to mass join is that group fusion assumes pre-existing relationships within both groups. Thus, it is important to recognize from the outset that the most expedient way to address group fusion is to treat it as either: On the other hand, creating a new group from scratch may be more secure 5 and not too expensive if both groups are relatively small. Another reason can be the need to re-assign the group controller's role. It is certainly possible to end the discussion of group fusion at this point. The outcome would be a heuristicor policy-driven decision to use (1) or (2) on a case-by-case basis. However, if only for purely academic reasons, it might be worthwhile to investigate more e cient, or at least more elegant, solutions geared speci cally towards group fusion. Although this remains a subject for future work, we brie y sketch one possible solution below. One promising approach to group fusion is a technique fashioned after the one developed by Steer et al. in 18] . In brief, suppose that two groups G 1 and G 2 currently using group keys K 1 and K 2 , respectively, would like to form a super-group. To do so, the two groups exchange their respective key residues: K1 and K2 and compute a new super-group key K 12 = K1K2 . The actual exchange can be undertaken by the group controllers. Note that this type of fusion is very fast since it can in principle be accomplished in one round of broadcast. Furthermore, reverting to the original group structure is easy since each group can simply fall back to using K 1 and K 2 at any time thus e ectively reversing the fusion but any other group split seems to require two complete and ine cient IKA operations. So unless one only has groups which only grow or only split into previously existing groups it seems easier to use the Mass Join protocol in Figure 6 .
Member Exclusion
The member exclusion protocol is illustrated in Figure 7 . In it, M n e ectively \re-runs" the last round of the IKA: as in member addition, it generates a new exponent c N n and constructs a new Broadcast message{ but with c N n N n instead of N n {using the most recently received Broadcast message. (Note that the last Broadcast message can be from an IKA or any AKA, depending which was the latest to take place.) M n then broadcasts the message to the rest of the group. The private exponents of the other group members remain unchanged. 5 Because re-running an IKA involves a liveness test of all group members. A notable side-e ect is that the excluded member's contribution N d is still factored into the new key. Nonetheless, this in no way undermines the new key's secrecy. In the event that the current group controller M n has to be excluded, any other M i can assume its role, assuming it stored the last Broadcast message.
Subgroup Exclusion
In most cases, subgroup exclusion is even simpler than single member exclusion. The protocol for mass leave is almost identical to that in gure 7. The only di erence is the group controller having to compute and send fewer sub-keys in the nal broadcast message. (Only those sub-keys corresponding to remaining members are computed and broadcast.) A slightly di erent scenario is that of group division when a monolithic group needs to be split into two or more smaller groups. The obvious way of addressing this is to select for each of the subgroups a subgroup controller which runs the group exclusion protocol within its subgroup by broadcasting only those sub-keys corresponding to subgroup members.
Key Refresh
There are two main reasons for the group key refresh operation:
limit exposure due to loss of group session keys limit the amount of ciphertext generated with the same key. 6 Whereas the second reason does not pose any special requirements for the key refresh protocol, the rst makes it important for the key refresh protocol not to violate key independence. (For example, this rules out using a straight-forward method of generating a new key as a result of applying a one-way hash function to the old key.) Additionally, we note that loss of a member's key share (N i ) can result in disclosure of all session keys contributed to by this member with this share. Therefore, not only should the session keys, but also individual key shares must be periodically refreshed. This procedure guarantees key independence between session keys and limits the damage of leaked key share to at most n epochs. We also note that this one-round protocol can be piggy-packed easily and at almost no cost on a group broadcast which is a likely operation assuming that the established group key is used to protect intra group communication.
6 Security Considerations for AKA Operations
In order to demonstrate security of the AKA protocols, we need to consider a snapshot in a life of a group, i.e., the lifespan and security of a particular short-term key.
The following sets are de ned: Note that the term future is used relative to the speci c session key. The issue at hand is the ability of all past and future members to compute the current key. K = N1 c NcNc+1 Nq
To simplify our discussion we collapse all members of P and F into a single powerful adversary (Eve). (This is especially tting since P and F are not necessarily disjoint.) The result is that Eve = P F and she possesses fN j ; jM j 2 (P; F)g.
We can thus rewrite the key as: " poly " denotes polynomial indistinguishability A n := (view(n; X); y), for a randomly chosen y 2 G, D n := (view(n; X); K(n; X)). view(n; X) := ordered set of all Ni 1 Ni m for all proper subsets fi 1 ; . . .; i m g of f1; . . .; ng, K(n; X) := N1 Nn . X = fN 1 ; . . .; N n g If we substitute n with c, X with E, and K(n; X) with K, it follows that K is polynomially indistinguishable from a random value. 2 Consequently, all AKA protocols presented above fall into the class of \natural" DH extensions de ned in Section 3.2 and bene t from the same security properties.
Related Work
The earliest attempt to extend DH to groups is due to Ingemarsson We note that this protocol falls into the class of natural DH extensions as de ned in 20]. It is, thus, suitable for use as an IKA protocol. However, because of its symmetry 8 (no natural group leader) it is di cult to use it as a foundation for auxiliary key agreement protocols. Another DH extension geared towards teleconferencing was proposed by Steer et al. in 18] . This protocol (referred to as STR) requires all members to have broadcasting facilities and takes n rounds to complete. In some ways, STR is similar to IKA.1. Both take the same number of rounds and involve asymmetric operation. Also, both accumulate keying material by traversing group members one per round. However, the group key in STR has a very di erent structure: K n = Nn N n?1 ::: N 3 N1N2 Interestingly, STR is well-suited for adding new members; see gure 10. As in IKA.1, it takes only two rounds to add a new member (assuming oating controller). Moreover, this protocol is computationally more e cient than IKA.1 member addition since fewer exponentiations take place. Member exclusion, on the other hand, is di cult in STR since there is no natural group controller. For example, excluding M 1 or M 2 is problematic since their exponents are used in the innermost key computation. In general, re-computing a common key (when M i leaves) is straight-forward for all M j , j < i. While, all M j , j > i need to receive input from lower-numbered members. One notable recent result is due to Burmester and Desmedt 4] . They construct a very e cient protocol (BD) which executes in only three rounds: Although it is computationally e cient, this protocol requires each member to receive three messages from three sources and to keep transient state in the process.
Summary
In summary, this paper identi ed the requirements for IKA and AKA operations and developed corresponding CLIQUES protocols based on the Di e-Hellman key exchange. The protocols presented above achieve secure and e cient key agrement in the context of dynamic peer groups. Such groups are relatively small and nonhierarchical. In large groups, it is unclear that key agreement is appropriate since collecting contributions from all members can become very costly. Instead, key distribution mechanisms can be used. This subject (key distribution in large and dynamic groups) is an active research area; for example, 7, 13, 10]. Our emphasis has been on bare key agreement resistant to passive attacks. In practice, one must contend with active attacks and intruders; to this end, authenticated key agreement must be employed. Related issues include key con rmation, group integrity and member authentication. These and other group security services are addressed in another paper 1].
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